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COPYRIGHT LAW-VIDEOTAPING LIVE TELEVISION NEWS
BROADCASTS FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES-WXIA -TV v. .Duncan, 8
MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1982).
I.

INTRODUCTION

A new area of copyright concern has been created with the ad
vent of videotape recording and the verbatim reproduction of televi
sion programs. l Until recently, videotape technology was used
almost exclusively within the communications industry.2 As the
equipment became more compact, less expensive, and easier to oper
ate, however, it entered the consumer market, bringing with it addi
tional legal issues. 3 Widespread access to a capability formerly
possessed by only a few has raised new questions concerning the
rights to programming which can be copied by the videotape pro
cess. Public attention has most recently been drawn to the Sony
Betamax case,4 which deals with the non-commercial home use of
entertainment programming. 5 The decision in the Sony case, how
ever, leaves unresolved many of the copyright problems created by
videotaping. 6
WXIA -TV v. .Duncan 7 addressed the copyright problems
brought about by videotaping a local news broadcast for commercial
purposes. 8 .Duncan is but one of many possible variations on the
Sony theme and it has the potential for establishing the criteria for
1. HOUSE COMMITIEE ON THE JUDICIARY H.R. REp. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
32 (1967). See also H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680 and NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECH
NOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 79 (Libr. ofCong. ed. 1979).
2. S. MAHONEY, N. DE MARTINO, & R. STENGEL, KEEPING PACE WITH THE NEW
TELEVISION 157 (1980).
3. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
q/f'd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cerl granted, 457 U.S. 1116
(1982), 52 U.S.L.W. 4090 (U.S. Jan 17, 1984).

4. Id.
5. 659 F.2d at 969.
6. Examples include the videotaping of news for commercial and non-commercial
use; the videotaping of entertainment and non-entertainment materials distributed by
pay cable for commercial use.
7. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1982).
8. Id. at 2076.
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analyzing one of the unresolved copyright issues spawned by video
tape technology in the area of television news.
The defendant, Carolyn Duncan, operates TV News Clips, a
business which regularly monitors and records local television news
programs. 9 Subsequently, she offers the clips for sale to the subjects
of the newscasts. lO On March 11, 1981, Ms. Duncan made an off
the-airll videotape recording of a WXIA-TV news story entitled
"Fitness Trail,"12 which she later sold to a client. 13
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, WXIA-TV, brought suit in the Fed
eral District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and sought
an injunction against defendant, TV News Clips, to prevent sale and
distribution of videotape copies of its copyrighted newscasts. 14 Plain
tiff maintained that the unauthorized copying of its telecast consti
tuted a violation of copyrightl5 and that the sale of those copies
impinged on WXIA-TV's market for sale of clips to the subjects of
news stories. 16 Defendant contended that its business activities fell
within the "fair use" exception 17 to the copyright laws. 18
Plaintiff's motion and defendant's cross motion for summary
judgment were denied by the court. 19 The court held that the lack of
factual information necessary to make a determination of fair use 20
made summary judgment untenable. Specifically, the court lacked
data on the extent of the television station's existing and planned
market for the sale of clips of its news stories. 21
9. Id.
10. /d.
II. "Qff-the-air" is defined as the direct transmission of a radio signal from the
transmitter of the broadcaster to a television or radio receiver. The signal is transmitted
through the air and no hard wires connect the transmission facility with the receiver.
The signal is received nearly simultaneously with broadcast. This is the method used by
television broadcasters. Cable operators pick up the off-the-air signals of broadcasters
and retransmit those signals by hard wire (cable) to their subscribers. D. PEMBER, MASS
MEDIA LAW 471 (2d ed. 1981).
12. WXIA-TV v. Duncan, 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2076.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2078-79.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 37-41. The Copyright Act of 1976 provides
a "fair use" defense to copyright infringement which states in part: "In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be
considered shall include-... (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.c. § 107 (Supp. V 1981).
18. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2076.
19. Id. at 2080.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2076, 2080.
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In denying the motions, the court focused on the actual and po
tential market for the sale of videotape television news stories. 22 Al
though the court thought it imperative to be able to define the
markets of the clipping service and the television station in order to
determine if there was any prejudice to the copyright holder's mar
ket,23 a more novel issue was also raised. The court questioned
whether WXIA-TV, in light of its duties as a public trustee, could
maintain its requisite journalistic integrity and still exploit a market
for the sale of video clips among the subjects of its news stories. 24
The court noted that dealings in this secondary market could suggest
a lack of impartiality or staging of the news by the television station
which would violate its public trust.2 5
This casenote will first examine the legal history which provides
the setting for current videotape copyright issues. Existing videotape
decisions will be surveyed to demonstrate that, until now, courts and
commentators have had to deal only with the videotaping of en
tertainment programming. The application of fair use analysis in
Duncan then will be examined to illustrate that the court has taken
note of the significance of the difference in content in news program
ming. Next, the legal characteristics of broadcast news will be ex
plained in order to decide whether those characteristics which
distinguish this case should be the basis for an analysis different
from that used by courts in the previous copyright cases. 26 Finally,
the casenote will consider whether the approach suggested m
Duncan should be applied in future news broadcast cases.
II.
A.

THE LEGAL SETTING

Historical Setting oj Copyright Law

Copyright law in the United States is derived from the Copy
right Clause of the Constitution: "The Congress shall have Power
... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."27
The purpose of the copyright clause is to advance the dissemi
22. Id. at 2078.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2078 n.9. See infra text accompanying notes 95-101 (explaining that a
broadcaster holds its license as a public trustee and is obligated to operate in the public
interest and to present news which is not staged or distorted).
25. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078 n.9.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 84-88.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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nation of information for the benefit of society.28 The framers of the
Constitution chose an economic mechanism to achieve that pur
pose. 29 The Supreme Court's analysis of the copyright clause has fo
cused on the built-in economic motivation of temporary monopoly.30
The economic philosophy on which the clause is based is the belief
that the prospect of personal gain will induce authors and inventors
to use their talents to advance the public welfare. 31
Congress has embodied this constitutional power in the Copy
right Act of 1976.32 Section 106 of the Act provides that "the owner
of copyright. . . has the exclusive rights. . . to reproduce the copy
righted work ... [and] to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership. . . ."33
Works that may be afforded copyright protection under section 106
are listed in the Act and include all original works, fixed in a tangi
ble form, including motion pictures or other audiovisual works. 34
The violation of any of the copyright holder's exclusive rights, as set
out in section 106 of the Act, constitutes copyright infringement3 5
and is the basis for an action. 36
28. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 8 (1978).
29. Id.
30. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
31. Id. The Court elaborated: "Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities
deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered." Id.
32. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2451 (codified at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V
1981».
33. 17 U.S.c. § 106(1), (3) (Supp. V 1981).
34. 17 U.S.c. § 102(a)(6) (Supp. V 1981). The work in dispute in WXIA-TV v.
Duncan is an audiovisual work as defined in 17 U.S.c. § 101 (Supp. V 1981): "'Audiovi
sual works' are works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically
intended to be shown by the use of machines, or ... electronic equipment, together with
accompanying sounds. . . regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films
or tapes, in which the works are embodied." Id. As explained in § 102(a), the two fun
damental criteria required for copyright protection are originality and fixation in tangi
ble form. Id. Fixation is defined in § 101 which states:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy ... , by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration. A work . . . is "fixed" . . . if a fixa
tion of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
Id. In his treatise, I M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 1-49 (rev. ed. 1981), Professor
Nimmer traces the root of this section of the Act: "If the word 'writings' [in the copyright
clause of the Constitution) is to be given any meaning whatsoever, it must, at the very
least, denote 'some material form, capable of identification and having a more or less
permanent endurance.''' Id. (quoting Canadian Admiral Corp. v. Reditfusion, Inc. Can.
Exch., 382, 383 (1954».
35. 17 U.S.c. § 501(a) (Supp. V 1981).
36~ Id. § 501(b).
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B. Fair Use
Copyright law, however, grants only a limited monopoly and
the Act specifies certain limitations on the exclusive rights enunci
ated in section 106. 37 In cases involving videotaping of copyrighted
program material, the courts have dealt principally with the defense
embodied in section 107 of the Act: "Limitations on exclusive rights:
Fair use." That section states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teach
ing. . . ,scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copy
right. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall
include
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work. 38

The question of copyright infringement arises when the user
copies from an original to the extent that the copy bears a substantial
similarity to the original work. 39 Fair use, then, is a privilege ac
corded to persons who do not own the copyright, to use copyrighted
material in a reasonable manner without the consent of the owner,
37. See supra text accompanying note 33.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. v 1981). The concept of fair use in the United States
was developed in case law and originally appeared in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 27
(C.C.O. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). The doctrine was first included in a federal copyright
statute when Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 without altering the common
law doctrine. O. JOHNSTON, COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK 131 (2d ed. 1982).
39. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 13-56 (rev. ed. 1981) describes the cir
cumstances in which fair use is a defense:
That problem arises where it is established. . . that the defendant has copied
sufficiently from the plaintiff so as to cross the line of substantial similarity.
The result must necessarily constitute an infringement unless the defendant is
rendered immune from liability because the particular use which he has made
of plaintiffs material is a 'fair use.' . . . Here 'fair use' is a defense. . . despite
the fact that the similarity is substantial.
/d.
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despite the owner's statutory monopoly.40 It has been suggested that
the most serviceable characterization of fair use is that it is a "use
necessary for the furtherance of knowledge, literature and the arts
and does not deprive the creator of the work of an appropriately
expected economic reward."41
The legislative history of the Copyright Act indicates an intent
to keep the statutory fair use provisions broad enough to be adapta
ble to technological advancements. 42 This is especially significant in
the videotaping cases where one of the characteristics of the medium
is that all copies are verbatim and therefore automatically overstep
the threshold of substantial similarity.43
The Copyright Act of 1976 has made special provisions only for
certain express types of off-the-air videotaping activities: the taping
of audiovisual news programs by libraries and archives44 and the
taping of certain other audiovisual works by noncommercial broad
casting entities. 45 These statutory provisions, and the narrow hold
ings of the videotape cases which have been decided to date,46
comprise the body of existing law in this field, leaving many ques
tions unresolved. 47 The cases prior to Duncan presented the vide
otaping problem in the context of entertainment programming.
Consequently, it is necessary to determine whether previous analyses
40. BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944) (quoted in Rosemont
Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 1966». For example, if an excerpt
from a copyrighted work is used in a book review or a professor's lecture where the
copier is engaged in creating an original work, fair use may be found. 3 M. NIMMER
supra note 39 at 13-59. But, a reproduction which is substantially similar and intended
to serve the same purpose as the original would not be considered a fair use. Id. at 13-59,
13-64.
41. L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 31 (1978). See a/so
Triangle Publications v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32
(1967). See a/so H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680.
43. Users who videotape copyrighted works in their entirety, adding nothing of
their own creativity, are faced with this situation. The Second Circuit has noted that
substantial and verbatim copying has usually precluded a finding of fair use. Rosemont
Enterprises V. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966).
44. 17 U.S.c. § 108(f)(3) (Supp. V 1981). This section indicates that the Act is not
to "be construed to limit the reproduction and distribution by lending of a limited
number of copies and excerpts by a library or archives of an audiovisual news program
. . . ." Id.
45. Id. § 118(d)(3). The Act provides for such activities as off-the-air videotaping
of copyrighted program material by public school systems and non-commercial televi
sion stations for classroom use. Id.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 48-62.
47. See supra note 6.
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and decisions are applicable to the videotaping issue when it arises
in the context of taping television news for commercial use.
C.

The Videotape Copyright Cases

In the earliest videotaping case, Walt Disney Productions v.
Alaska Television Network ,48 a federal district court held that off
the-air videotaping of copyrighted entertainment programs in their
entirety for later transmission by a remote cable system to its sub
scribers was a copyright infringement. 49 Commentators interpreted
this holding as the formulation of a rule that off-the-air videotaping
undertaken for commercial purposes necessarily constitutes copy
right infringement. 50
Ten years later, a television commercial was the subject matter
at issue in Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co. 51 The commercial was
taped off-the-air and six frames of the resulting videotape were used
by the copier for commercial purposes in his market research busi
ness. 52 The court found that deriving profit from the use of a small
portion of the work did not render the use unfair, especially in light
of the fact that the use did not compete with the copyrighted work
and did not diminish the value of the originaLS3
Off-the-air videotaping of copyrighted sports programming was
held to constitute copyright infringement in New Boston Television,
Inc. v. Entertainment Sports Programming. 54 In that case cable oper
ators transmitted highlights of baseball and hockey games excerpted
from plaintiffs copyrighted broadcasts to their own cable custom
48. 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
49. Id. at 1075.
50. 3 M. NIMMER supra note 39 at 13-94 states that, "it is clearly an act of copy
right infringement to reproduce a copyrighted work off the air for commercial purposes
either by audio tape or video tape." (citing Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television
Network, 310 F.Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) and New Boston Television v. Entertain
ment Sports Programming, 1981-83 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,293 (D. Mass.
1981». Edward B. Samuels has written: "Video recording for commercial purposes, par
ticularly distribution of copies, would clearly constitute infringement of a copyrighted
work." Samuels, Copyright and the New Communications Technologies, 25 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 905, 915 (1980). Another author has conceded that users of copyrighted materi
als videotaped off-the-air would have to qualify under the fair use doctrine in order not
to violate the Copyright Act. Copyright: No Fair Use Excuse jor Sony's Home Vide
orecording Infringement, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 679, 682-83 (1982).
51. 202 U.S. P.Q. (BNA) 809, 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,105 (N.D.
Cal. 1979).
52. Id. at 810,1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,105, at 15,584-86.
53. Id. at 811-12, 1978-81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,105, at 15,587.
54. 1981-83 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,293 (D. Mass. 1981).
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ers.55 The issue of whether the potential markets of the copyright
owner were prejudiced was essential to the court's grant of a prelimi
nary injunction. 56 Although the plaintiff television station had not
attempted to market game highlights to cable systems, the court
found that that was not a sufficient basis to permit the defendant to
appropriate the copyrighted programming and effectively preclude
the plaintiff from entering that market. It reasoned that copyright
owners were free to determine when they will exploit their copyright
in the various markets. 57
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Universal
City Studios v. Sony Corp. ofAmerica, the Sony Betamax case,58 held
that off-the-air home videotaping of copyrighted entertainment pro
gramming for non-commercial home use constitutes an infringement
of copyright.59 The Supreme Court reversed. 60
The highly organized and systematic practice of making off-the
air videotapes of copyrighted educational audiovisual materials for
nonprofit educational use by a school district was not a fair use ac
cording to the court in Encyclopedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks .61 There, the court relied upon the showing that the unau
thorized videotaping was the cause of actual, as well as potential,
harm to the copyright holder's market. 62
The history of the videotape cases indicates that the market fac
tor has thus far been determinative of the outcome of the fair use
defense. While the cases to date have concerned the videotaping of
entertainment, sports, advertising, and educational programs for
commercial and non-commercial uses, Duncan presents the vide
otaping question in a new context. For the first time, a court has had
to deal with off-the-air videotaping of news for commercial use. 63
The cases and commentators are able to offer little guidance in
developing an analytical approach to the problem raised in
Duncan 64 because there are special legal characteristics of broadcast
news that distinguish it from the types of programming previously
55. Id. at 16,625, 16,627.
56. Id. at 16,627.
57. /d.
58. 480 F.Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116 (1982).
59. 659 F.2d at 977.
60. 52 U.S.L.W. 4090 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1984).
61. 542 F.Supp. 1156, 1185 (W.O. N.Y. 1982).
62. id. at 1170-71.
63. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2075 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1982).
64. The commentators have not yet considered the unique issues inherent in the
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litigated. 65 As noted above, in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976,
Congress declined to act on most videotaping issues 66 and the Final
Report to Congress of the National Commission on New Technolog
ical Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) also sidestepped the
issue. 67

III.
A.

THE ApPLICATION OF FAIR USE ANALYSIS IN WXIA-TV V.
DUNCAN

Fair Use: The Market Factor

In Duncan, the court established that plaintiffs news program
was properly registered 68 and that the material contained in the "Fit
ness Trail" story was copyrightable. 69 The court then considered
application of fair use standards to the facts of the case, stating that
the last of the four fair use factors set forth in the Act, the effect on
potential markets of the copyrighted work,7° was the most impor
tant,71 The court stated that it would postpone analysis of the other
fair use factors until trial on the merits. 72
The court's major concern with regard to the market factor was
WXIA-TV's allegation that it had both primary and secondary mar
kets for the sale of its news and that TV News Clips' operation paral
leled and prejudiced the secondary market,?3 The primary market
consisted of the advertisers who sponsored the news program and
nature of copyrighted news and their analyses deal only with content devoid of the spe
cial characteristics of news. See supra note 50.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
66. Only two limited instances of videotape copying are mentioned in the Act. See
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
67. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
WORKS, FINAL REPORT 79 (Libr. of Congo ed. 1979) (stating that "the issues involved in
off-the-air videotaping were essentially matters requiring public policy decisions and
should be left for the courts to decide.").
68. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2077.
69. Id. at 2077-78.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (Supp. V 1981) states that the fourth factor is "the effect of
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Id. The section
also indicates that there may be other determinative factors in addition to those listed in
the Act. Id. The Second Circuit, in Meeropol V. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977),
stated the proposition simply: "A key issue in fair use cases is whether defendant's use
tends to diminish or prejudice the potential sale of plaintitrs work." Id. at 1070.
7\. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078. See also Triangle Publications V. Knight
Ridder Newspapers, 445 F.Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), affd, 626 F.2d 1171, 1175, 1177; 3
M. NIMMER supra note 39 at 13-64; L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COpy
RIGHT 32 (1978) (stating that the fourth fair use factor is the most important.)
72. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2080.
73. Id. at 2079 n.lO.
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the secondary market was made up of the subjects and entities in the
news stories. 74
The court stated that evidence of the extent of WXIA-TV's ac
tual or planned participation in the secondary market was necessary
to enable application of a functional test for fair use. 75 This func
tional test is meant to determine whether a user's copy serves the
same function and therefore can fulfill the demand for the copyright
holder's original work.76 If it is shown that the copy is a reasonable
substitute for the original, then under the functional test, the defense
of fair use is unavailing as the user's copy may harm the market for
the original. 77 Lacking the necessary information, the court was un
able to decide whether TV News Clips had prejudiced a pre-existing
or anticipated market of the plaintiff. 78
B.

Fair Use: The Nature

of the

Copyrighted Material

In addition to proposing use of the functional test for determin
ing the effect on the market, the court expressed serious reservations
regarding the propriety of a television station cultivating a market
for the sale of video news clips among the subjects of its newscasts. 79
These doubts arose both from an awareness of the need for a broad
caster to maintain a reputation for journalistic integrity in order to
attract sponsors and the obligations of a broadcaster to serve the
public interest. 80 The court speculated that "[i]f there are certain in
herent boundaries, arising from the peculiar nature of broadcast
news, on Plaintiffs use of its news stories, and if Defendant's use lies
outside those boundaries, then it may be impossible for Plaintiffs
74.

Id. at 2078-79 n.9.
Id. at 2079.
76. Wainwright Securities v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). As explained in 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 39, at
13-67 to 13-69, if plaintiff is a publisher of sheet music and defendant engages in the
unauthorized publication of plaintiffs lyrics in a magazine, the use is a non-infringing
fair use as the function it serves is different from that of the original. Plaintiffs sheet
music is intended to be used for musical performances while defendant's use is a literary
presentation. The magazine article cannot fulfill the same function as the sheet music.
But if defendant reproduced song sheets, it would be an infringement as the song sheets
can be used for musical presentation in the same way as the original. Id.
77. Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcasting Cos, 621 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir.
1980); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Productions, 479 F.Supp. 351,
361 (N .0. Ga. 1979); Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 503
F.Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 3 M. NIMMER supra note 39, at 13-66, 13-67, 13-70.
78. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2080 n.ll.
79. Id. at 2078.
80. Id. at 2078-79 n.9.
75.
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and Defendant's purposes to overlap."81 By recognizing the "pecu
liar nature of broadcast news," the court has implied that the second
fair use factor, "the nature of the copyrighted work," may be a major
concern when broadcast news programming is videotaped. 82 The
court implied that when program content is not vested with public
interest, the market factor is logically the weightiest consideration in
a videotape copyright case. 83 When a news program is at issue, how
ever, the court indicated the nature of the work can justifiably mod
ify the analysis of the market factor. Although the Duncan court did
not explicitly acknowledge reliance upon the second factor, its un
derlying rationale broke new ground in the analysis of videotape
copyright cases.
IV.

BROADCAST NEWS: THE UNIQUE ASPECT OF

WXIA-TV

V. DUNCAN

Any comprehensive analysis of the videotaping of news must
take into account two key aspects of broadcast news: the nature of
copyright protection accorded to news and the public interest char
acteristic of the news. The copyright protection afforded news is dif
ferent from that afforded other materials because, unlike other
materials, the news itself cannot be copyrighted. 84 The first author
to report an event does not have a monopoly on the coverage of that
event. Instead, only the form of expression and the literary quality
of a news report may be accorded copyright protection. 85 The
81. Id. at 2079 n.lO.
82. See supra text accompanying note 38.
83. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078. On that basis, copyright protection was af
forded to producers of entertainment and sports programming for broadcast television
because they had potential markets for their product on cable television. Walt Disney
Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, 310 F.Supp. 1073, 1075 (W.D. Wash. 1969); New
Boston Television v. Entertainment Sports Programming, 1981-83 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) ~ 25,293 (D.Mass. 1981). The decisions in Encyclopedia Britannica Educational
Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F.Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978),542 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)
and Bruzzone v. Miller Brewing Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809, 1978-1981 COPYRIGHT L.
REp. ~ 25,105 (N.D. Cal. 1979) dealt with the effects of the activities of users on the
existing primary market of the copyright holder for advertising and educational materi
als. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 480 F.Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979) t:ifj'd in part,
rev'd in part, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 457 U.S. 1116, concerned the
harm caused to plaintiffs' primary market for the sale of entertainment programs to thea
ters and television networks by the entry of defendants into the secondary market for
home videorecording in which plaintiff did not participate.
84. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
85. See Chicago Record-Herald v. Tribune Ass'n., 275 F. 797, 798 (7th Cir. 1921);
Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); I M. NIMMER
supra note 34, at 2-158 to 2-160.
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holder of a copyright in a news program thus has only partial copy
right protection.
The news, whether broadcast or conveyed in print, also is set
apart because of its public interest characteristic and the essential
role of the free press in our democracy. 86 There is a strong interest
in unlimited access to the news in order to keep the public informed.
Because of this, fair use may be found when there is a "public inter
est in having the fullest information available."87 To assure that the
news is a reliable source of information, there is also a need for the
exercise of journalistic integrity.88
The uniqueness of broadcast journalism stems from the philoso
phy of broadcast regulation in the United States. Regulation of
broadcasting, including allocation of frequencies within the radio
spectrum, was instituted in 1927 89 to end the chaos prevailing in the
industry.9o As the spectrum of radio frequencies is finite,91 not all
who apply for licenses to broadcast can be accommodated. 92 There
fore, the Federal Radio Commission, the predecessor to the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), concluded that this scarcity of
frequencies necessitated that licenses be awarded only to the compet
ing applicants demonstrating responsiveness to the public "conven
ience, interest or necessity."93
As a public trustee, the broadcaster's obligation is to inform the
public fairly and impartially.94 The broadcaster's latitude of jour
nalistic freedom is circumscribed by that public responsibility.95 Op
erating in the public interest requires, for example, that broadcasters
devote air time to matters of public significance and that news re
ports be journalistically balanced. 96 In broadcast journalism, unlike
86. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971).
87. Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
88. In re CBS Program "Hunger in America", 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 152 (1969).
89. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by The Communi
cations Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416 § 602,48 Stat. 1102.
90. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C. 395 U.S. 367, 375 (1969).
91. The radio spectrum and the frequencies which comprise the spectrum are lim
ited because the airwaves are capable of carrying only a certain number of signals. D.
PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 423 (2d ed. 1981).
92. Columbia Broadcasting sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101
(1973).
93. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1969) (quoting Radio
Act of 1927 § 4, 44 Stat. 1163).
94. Columbia Broadcasting sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 117
( 1973).
95. Id. at 110.
96. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 377 (quoting Great Lakes
Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993, cert.
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print journalism, the interest at stake is not the broadcaster's right to
speak, but the right of the public to be informed. 97 It follows that
broadcasters violate their public trust if they distort or stage the
news. 98
It was the problem of staging and distortion that the court in
Duncan anticipated in considering whether a television station could
create a market for the sale of souvenir news clips in an attempt to
generate additional revenue. 99 The court suggested that the entry of
a television station into the secondary market created the potential
for abuse of its public trust 100 through the production of stories
about the subjects and entities who were likely to buy videotape
clips. 101
Ideally, a decision in a case involving the videotaping of news
will take into account the copyright considerations and the unique
aspects of broadcasting: the public interest in widespread dissemina
tion of impartial news reports. An ideal decision will also recognize
the need for flexibility in dealing with new technologies and the fact
that news is accorded only partial copyright protection.
In deciding WXIA-TV v. Duncan on the merits, the court con
fronts three possible resolutions to the issue: That the use by TV
News Clips constituted a copyright infringement; 102 that the use was
dismissed, 281 U.S. 706 (1930». The enforcement mechanism lies in the power of the
government to grant or deny requests for license renewals and construction permits. 47
U.S.c. § 307 (Supp. V 1981 & West 1983),47 C.F.R. § 73.3591 (1982).
97. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367,390 (1969); Columbia Broad
casting sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102, 112-13 (1973).
98. In re CBS Program "Hunger in America," 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 150 (1969) (stat
ing that the F.C.C. can investigate if there is "material indication of extrinsic evidence of
staging or distortion," quoting from Letter to ABC, 16 F.C.C. 2d 650 (1969». See also
National Org. for Women V. F.C.C., 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that
"the licensee's news judgment will not be questioned unless there is extrinsic evidence of
deliberate distortion or news staging. . . or unless the licensee consistently fails to report
news events of public importance that could not in good faith be ignored.").
99. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078-79 n.9.
100. Although the Duncan court did not name the specific abuses of public trust
which it considered likely, a list of possible abuses stemming from the production of
stories about likely clip customers can be formulated from a survey of broadcasters' trus
teeship responsibilities. Abuses might include diminishing journalistic integrity, lessen
ing of impartiality, decreasing amounts of time devoted to matters of public significance
and the undermining of journalistic balance. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
Staging and distortion of the news are logical outcomes of a decision to produce news
stories for the purpose of generating clip sales among the subjects and entities in the
stories.
101. Id. at 2079 n.lO.
102. This holding would be consistent with previous copyright decisions in Univer
sal City Studios V. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981); Encyclopedia Britannica
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not an infringement as WXIA-TV is precluded from entering the
secondary market; 103 or that the use did not constitute an infringe
ment as copyright protection is not afforded to the secondary market
for news broadcasts. 104 A finding of infringement, while protecting
plaintiffs secondary market, would ignore the public interest in
widespread dissemination of the news lO5 by cutting off a distributor
to the secondary market. The finding of infringement would also
reflect an unwarranted rigidity in that it would fail to accomodate a
videotape technology,I06 which is capable only of producing copies
bearing substantial similarity to the original. 107 The question would
still remain whether the television station's monopolistic activity in .
the secondary market would lead eventually to abuse of its public
trusteeship responsibilities. 108
By postulating that the unique qualities of broadcast journalism
may prevent television stations from exploiting the secondary mar
ket, the court indicated a predisposition to a finding for the defend
ant based upon the conclusion that public interest considerations
would preclude WXIA-TV's entry into the secondary market. 109
Forbidding a broadcaster's entry into this secondary market in order
to permit unlimited videotape copying and promote the public inter
est, is a severe measure and would make public trusteeship unneces
sarily burdensome. I10
Application of this mechanism as a means to guarantee respon
sible trusteeship and stifle opportunities for abuse also would require
a distinct departure from current practice. At present, broadcasters
are not prohibited from developing secondary markets for the sale of
Educ. corp. v. Crooks, 542 F.Supp. 1156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Walt Disney Productions v.
Alaska Television Network, 310 F.Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969) and New Boston Tele
vision v. Entertainment Sports Programming, 1981 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,293
(D. Mass. 1981).
103. This holding is suggested by the court in the instant case, 8 MEDIA L. REP.
(BN A) at 2079 n.lO.
104. A similar decision in Bruzzone v. Miller Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 809, 1978
81 COPYRIGHT L. REP. ~ 25,105 (N.D. Cal. 1979) was based on a finding that the copy of
a small portion of the original did not serve the same function or decrease the value of
the copyrighted work.
105. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971); Time Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 146 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
106. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Congo & Ad. News 5659, 5680.
107. See JUpra notes 39, 43.
108. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117
(1973).
109. 8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2079 n.lO.
110. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. V. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110.
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videotape clips of their stories. This is exemplified by the fact that
WXIA-TV, without any reservation as to its propriety or legality,
has been able to assert its position in the secondary market. 111 Fur
ther, In re CBS Program "Hunger in America" I 12 and National Or
ganizationfor Women v. F. C C 113 indicate that the FCC will inquire
into allegations of distortion and staging only in the most extreme
situations. 114 The current standard in broadcast journalism has been
protected and maintained by the exercise of the news judgment of
the broadcaster which generally is questioned by the FCC only when
trusteeship responsibilities are flagrantly or consistently flouted. I IS
Since the current standard provides adequate protection without re
sort to severe constraints, it is unnecessary to deny the broadcaster's
entry into the secondary market as a means of alleviating concern
about the reliability of broadcast news.
An approach that would withhold copyright protection from the
holder's secondary market also presents a problem in that failure to
protect an established or potential market of a plaintiff in a videotap
ing case is inconsistent with the application of orthodox fair use
analysis. 116 Traditionally, when the use parallels or prejudices the
copyright holder's actual or potential market, infringement has been
found. ll7 Orthodox fair use analysis, however, may be altered in
certain circumstances.
The copyright clause is designed to encourage the dissemipation
of information and ideas I 18 while public policy dictates full access to
undistorted news reporting. 119 Videotape technology is capable of
serving those goals by increasing the availability of news stories. But
videotaping, because of its limited ability only to make verbatim
copies, is also in conflict with copyright law. 120 Verbatim copying by
videotape captures not only the news, it appropriates the author's
form of expression which may be protected by copyright law.121
When a copyright problem such as this is created by the use of a new
Plaintiffs Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 2.
112. 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 150 (1969).
113. 555 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
114. See supra note 98.
115. Id. See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. at 110 (explaining that "Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to de
velop with the widest journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations.").
116. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43, 48-62.
117. 3 M. NIMMER supra note 37, at 13-66 to 13-67.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 86-88.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
121. See supra text accompanying note 85.
III.
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technology, Congress has authorized the application ofjudicial inno
vation. 122 The legislative history of the fair use doctrine, as embod
ied in the Copyright Act of 1976, illustrates the intention of Congress
to grant courts the freedom to adapt the doctrine on a case-by-case
basis when the copyright issues arise from the use of technological
innovations.123 This intent was confirmed at the time of passage
when it was declared that "there is no disposition to freeze the doc
trine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological
change."124 Thus, orthodox fair use analysis may be altered when
the copyright issues arise due to the use of a new technology. Since
the peculiar qualities of videotape technology have given rise to the
copyright issue in Duncan, the court essentially has Congressional
approval to fashion a decision not rooted in orthodox fair use
rationale. 125
When the issue presented is the copying of news, there is added
justification for modifying fair use analysis by giving less weight to
the fourth, or market, factor and giving more than traditional em
phasis to the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted material.
The justification for the shift lies in the fact that, unlike entertain
ment programming, news is vested with unique qualities which in
clude a strong public interest and that, in any event, only partial
copyright protection can be afforded to any news story.126
The concept of fair use embodies the balancing of the public
interest and the interest of the copyright holder, which were estab
lished in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. 127 Viewed as a
dual risk approach, each "determination of fair use . . . will decide
whether the [copyright holder's] expectation of economic reward was
or was not appropriate, and such a determination ought to coincide
with a simultaneous judgment about whether society's expectation of
122. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
123. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Congo 1st Sess. 32
(1967).
124. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680.
125. HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Congo 1st Sess. 32
(1967).
We endorse the purpose and general scope of . . . the doctrine in the statute,
especially during a period of rapid technological change. Beyond a very broad
statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable to it,
the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case
by-case basis.

Id.
126. See Time Inc. V. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F.Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
127. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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denial of access was or was not appropriate."128 Due to the magni
tude of the public interest in the widest possible dissemination of
information, the balance is tipped in favor of the user when the con
tent of the broadcast is news. It is for this reason that the "scope of
fair use is greater when informational type works, as opposed to
more creative products, are involved."129 This means that the rela
tive importance of the second fair use factor, the nature of the copy
righted work, is far greater when news is at issue than when
. entertainment programming is in question. 130 Consideration of the
nature of the work, then, will justifiably modify an analysis of the
market effect.
By giving added recognition to the nature of the copyrighted
work, the court in Duncan may find a fair use which will allow the
plaintiff and defendant to operate in the same market. Such a deci
sion will accomodate the public interest, permit the broadcaster to
exploit the secondary market, and will responsibly acknowledge the
realities and limitations of videotape technology. The secondary
market will be open to as many distributors as choose to compete.
This will allow for widespread dissemination of the news and should
curb any tendency by the television station to distort or stage the
news in order to stimulate clip sales. The benefits to the station of
that kind of manipulation would be less significant in the situation in
which total revenues from clip sales are shared among competitors.
The opening of the secondary market will also recognize a legitimate
use of videotape technology by those who are not broadcasters and
lack the capability or intent to disturb the broadcasters' primary
market.
V.

CONCLUSION

The short history of videotape copyright cases consists of deci
sions based primarily on the fair use market factor and deal with
creative entertainment programs not vested with a public interest. 131
Where there has been any prejudice to an existing or potential mar
ket by a user, an infringement has been found. 132
Duncan raised the videotaping issue in the context of news and
the court indicated that the previously employed analysis was inca
128.
129.

L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 30-31 (1978).
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (1981).

130. Id.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 46-60.
132. Id.
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pable of resolving the unique concerns of broadcast journalism. \33
The news itself is not copyrightable; there is a public interest in mak
ing news widely available; and public trusteeship requires the broad
caster to air impartial reports on important issues. The court
suggested that these distinguishing features made it necessary in this
instance to give emphasis to another fair use factor, the nature of the
copyrighted material. 134
While the plaintiff, WXIA-TV, sought protection for its secon
dary market in sales of news clips to the subjects of its news stories,
the court questioned whether the nature of broadcast journalism did
not preclude the television station from making such sales. There
would be no incentive to plan deliberately news stories about likely
customers for clips if the television station could not add to its reve
nues in this manner.135 The Duncan court suggested a two step ap
proach. The first step it is to determine whether the broadcaster can
operate legitimately in the secondary market. The second step is
traditional market factor analysis in which the user will have a fair
use if the owner does not have a potential secondary market at
stake. 136
While it is desirable that the law take cognizance of the realities
and the pervasiveness of videotape technology, as directed in the leg
islative history of the Copyright Act of 1976, the solution proposed
by the court is unduly harsh on the copyright holder. Thoughtful
consideration of broadcast regulations shows that it is unnecessary to
prevent a broadcaster from entering a secondary market in order to
maintain current journalistic standards. 137
If the courts consider the second fair use factor, "the nature of
the copyrighted work," in addition to the market factor, a more
fitting outcome can be achieved. The special characteristics of
broadcast news, the need for widespread dissemination, and prohibi
tion against distortion are best served by a finding of fair use. All
current markets for the distribution of WXIA-TV's news stories, in
cluding WXIA-TV's secondary market, can be preserved if the mar
ket factor alone is not determinative. The rewards of intentional
staging of news stories are minimized when the plaintiff has to share
the fruits of the market with defendant and other prospective com
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

8 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) at 2078-79.
Id. at 2079 n.lO.
Id. at 2078 n.9.
Id. at 2079 n.lO.
See supra note 111-115 and accompanying text.
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petitors. This holding will move the law one step closer to defining
correctly the parameters of legitimate videotaping activity.
Joan C Steiger

A UTHOR'S NOTE: The merits of WXIA-TV v. Duncan were decided on
October 13, 1983. The court held that the verbatim copying and sale of the
"Fitness Trail" segment by Ms. Duncan constituted infringement of
WXIA-TV's copyright in that news feature story. Defendant Duncan's fair
use defense failed as her use was not an "inherently productive or creative
use" within the meaning of section 107. The court, however, found no basis
on which to grant WXIA-TV's request for injunctive relief. The court
noted that the television station abandons its copyright by destroying tapes
of news broadcasts one week after air date and maintenance of copyright
protection in the secondary market is not needed to provide a creative in
centive to WXIA-TV. The court stated, in addition, that Ms. Duncan's
copying and sales could represent a modest social benefit since the news
broadcasts of WXIA-TV are "infused with a high degree of public interest,"
although her activity "does not substantially further public dissemination
or perpetuation of news accounts."
At trial, the plaintiff, WXIA-TV, did not assert prejudice to its secon
dary market and actual damages were found to be de minimis. Judgment
was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $35. WXIA-TV v. Duncan,
572 F. Supp. 1186 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

